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Abstract The paper conducts a comparative study across the Arab world in the Middle
East and Africa to determine whether variations exist in environmental performance. Using
various indicators of performance, including the 2010 environmental performance index
and the total number of international environmental agreements signed, ratified, or
accessed by individual governments, the paper concludes that the Arab world is at par with
the developing world with its environmental performance. The paper empirically shows
that economic well-being determines environmental performance, thus providing evidence
to support the EKC-type hypothesis.
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1 Introduction
The global environmental movement has reached the developing and the less developed
world, with varying degrees of success. While the concerns differ across the countries,
there is global acknowledgement that environmental issues deserve attention and com-
mitment. The Arab world1 of the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and North Africa,
while sharing a common language and religion, enjoy economic diversity and has a variety
of concerns and interests when dealing with economic and environmental issues. The
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countries of the Gulf region2 are characterized by high income and are relatively richer as
they rely heavily on abundant energy resources and oil exports. These countries have a
relatively poorer endowment of labor and as such import labor intensively. Algeria, Iraq,
and Syria are well endowed with natural resources and labor. On the other hand, the
countries of North Africa,3 with the exception of Algeria, have a relatively poorer natural
resource base but a more abundant labor supply. Jordan and Lebanon are similarly
endowed with low natural resources and high labor. The Sub-Saharan Arab countries,4 on
the other hand, are characterized by low-income and high-labor supply.
The objective of this paper is to study the state of the environmental involvement and
performance in the Arab world, relative to a large sample of countries in the developing
world, by reviewing various indicators of local, regional, and international commitments.
The paper conducts a comparative study across the Arab world in the Middle East and
Africa to determine whether variations exist in environmental awareness, involvement, and
performance. Environmental awareness is a difficult concept to quantify; it may be defined
as the acknowledgement of consequences of man-made decisions on nature. Terms such as
environmental consciousness, sensitivity, and responsiveness, among others, may define
awareness. However, to be able to measure awareness, economists and environmental
researchers would have much difficulty. How can awareness be measured? What deter-
mines awareness? Education? Income? The prevailing state of the environment? The
environmental movement started several decades ago, and it was the elite’s movement.
How is it viewed nowadays?
While it is quite difficult to measure awareness, it is possible to measure the levels of
involvement in environmental issues. In this paper, we compile various measures or
indicators of environmental involvement in order to conduct the comparative analysis.
Moreover, we hypothesize that any variation in environmental involvement and perfor-
mance, if it exists, could be explained by economic well-being and various other socio-
economic and environmental quality indicators and we make an attempt to test the
relationship. We propose the relation to be theoretically similar to the environmental
Kuznets curve (EKC) that basically assumes that the level of economic development and
environmental degradation is initially positively related with the relationship changing into
a negative one with increased level of development, hence, yielding an inverted U-shaped
curve.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a comparative review of envi-
ronmental concern and responsiveness in the Arab world, collectively and individually.
Various indicators of environmental engagement and performance are compiled and
compared across the countries. Section 3 presents an empirical model that helps identify
determinants of observed variations in the environmental indicators. Section 4 concludes
the paper by highlighting its contribution and the shortcomings.
2 Importance of environmental issues in the Arab world
If the League of Arab States represents the broad issues that the member states agree on
and consider important, then environment and the protection of environment must be the
2 Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates make up the Gulf Cooperation
Council Countries (the GCC countries).
3 Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia.
4 Djibouti, Mauritania, Somalia and Sudan.
744 S. Djoundourian
123
important issues. In addition to the general assembly and the Foreign Affairs Ministerial
Committee, the League has 12 Specialized Standing Committees that deal with various
issues of concern to its members. Environmental issues represent one such specialized
subcommittee. The membership in these committees is reserved for the respective min-
isters in each of the 22 states. When a country does not have a stand-alone ministry, then
the minister in charge of the issue is a member of the said committee.
Having established a standing committee on environmental issues, as a group, the Arab
countries have demonstrated, at least on paper, interest in environmental issues. This
interest may be genuine, or it may be in response to pressure from peer organizations. For
instance, being a part of the world community may have obliged these states, as a group, to
portray concern when in fact the concern is not genuine. There are timid indicators that the
Arab countries are sometimes ahead of other countries in their dealing with the issues
concerning the protection of the environment. For example, in 2010, Algeria was ranked 42
among 163 countries with respect to its environmental performance index; Morocco was
ranked 52 and Syria 56 (see 2010 Environmental Performance Index). Another example to
use would be the UN Convention on the law of Non-Navigational uses of International
Watercourses of 1997; this convention was signed by only 8 countries in the world
including three Arab countries: Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria.
In order to assess the involvement of each of the states in environmental issues, there is
a need to look at each member state individually and determine its level of commitment.
There are several indicators of environmental commitment and engagement that we will
use to conduct this comparative study. At the local level, the establishment of specialized
ministries of environment and environmental law is used as a preliminary indicator of
involvement. At the international level, taking part in regional and international environ-
mental conventions is used an indicator of engagement and commitment. Finally, the
environmental performance index and its components are used as quantitative indicators of
environmental stewardship.
2.1 Environmental ministries and laws
A preliminary indicator of environmental awareness and commitment at the national level
may be the establishment of a full-fledged ministry of environment with the necessary
environmental laws and regulations. Table 1 presents the compiled data by country. The
name and the responsibility of the ministry in charge of the environment vary across
countries. Nine of the 22 countries have ministries that deal exclusively with the envi-
ronment. The others have ministries that deal with more than one concern; for instance,
Saudi Arabia has established the presidency for meteorology and environmental protection,
Sudan has the Ministry of Environment and Physical Development, and Yemen has
Ministry of Water and Environment. Oman and West Sahara are the only two countries
without ministries for environmental affairs. It is important to note that for West Sahara,
we were not able to find any information that indicates sovereignty. From the available
information, we are able to conclude that many of the countries of the Arab League have
incorporated the environment as part of their government structure. In fact, few of the
ministries such as that of Lebanon, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates have developed state
of the art web pages that provide important information about the fundamental environ-
mental problems that their respective countries are facing. Stovall (1998) had reported that
governments in the Middle East appeared satisfied with ‘‘laying the groundwork’’ for
environmental protection, by establishing environmental protection agencies, but without
giving these agencies the authority to implement and enforce the existing laws.
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The year of establishment of environmental law is viewed as an indicator of environ-
mental engagement. Saudi Arabia was the first Arab country to have established an
environmental law in 1992. Egypt’s environmental law was passed in 1994 with several
amendments to the law since then. Somalia is the only country without an environmental
law. Djibouti was expected to pass an environmental law in 2009, no information is
available on whether it did or not. Note that the year of establishing a full-fledged ministry
in charge of the environment does not necessarily coincide with the year of establishment
of environmental law. In Lebanon, for instance, the Ministry of Environment in Lebanon
was established in 1993, marking a significant step forward in the management of envi-
ronmental affairs. Prior to that, a state ministry of environment was created in 1981;
however, there was no global environmental law. Specific issues were addressed in sector
laws and regulations. These laws included the protection of natural sites, forestry, arche-
ological and touristic sites, drinking water, sewage, marine pollution, air pollution,
industry, hunting, fishing, urban development, mining, food control, housing, and toxic
waste disposal. A comprehensive environmental law in Lebanon was established in 2002
(see Djoundourian 2009).
The review of the environmental laws and their amendments in the individual countries
indicate that there are significant variation in the extent of coverage and comprehensive-
ness of the laws. For instance, United Arab Emirates have developed a relatively large
body of environmental regulations based on local orders. Many of the regulations are
Table 1 Year of establishment of environmental law (if it exists) by country
Country Entity in charge of environment Year
Algeria Ministry of regional planning and environment 2001
Bahrain Ministry of housing, municipalities, and environment 1996
Djibouti Ministry of home, urbanism, environment, and land planning Expected
Egypt Ministry of environmental affairs 1994
Iraq Ministry of environment 1997
Jordan Ministry of environment 2006
Kuwait Environment public authority 2001
Lebanon Ministry of environment 2002
Libya Ministry of health and environment 2003
Mauritania The Ministry of environment and sustainable development 2000
Morocco Minister of energy, mining, water, and environment 2003
Oman NA 2001
Palestine Ministry of environmental affairs 1999
Qatar Ministry of environment 2002
Saudi Arabia Presidency of meteorology and environment protection 1992
Somalia Ministry of environment NA
Sudan Ministry of environment and physical development 2001
Syria Ministry of local administration and environment 2002
Tunisia The ministry of environment and sustainable development 2003
United Arab Emirates Ministry of environment and water 1999
West Sahara NA 2004
Yemen Ministry of water and environment 1995
Source: compiled by author from various Web sites
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comprehensive covering standards, monitoring and enforcement mechanism, remediation
options, and penalty structure. The latest addition to the environmental law in UAE, Law
#19 of 2009, concerns a ban importing animals from South Africa. In Algeria, on the other
hand, the latest addition to the environmental law, Law# 2007–2006, deals exclusively
with the protection and development of green spaces. While it would be an interesting
exercise to have a comparative analysis of the extent of coverage and comprehensiveness
of the laws across the Arab world, that exercise is beyond the scope of the current paper.
The success in implementation of environmental laws in the Arab world varies across
countries. According to an article published in Jordan Times on January 5 2009, the
Ministry of Environment and the Royal Environment Protection Department in Jordan
dealt with 17,674 environmental violations in 2008, with industrial violations and illegal
logging constituting the majority of infringements. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has the
most severe penalties for acts involving the introduction of hazardous material and
radioactive wastes into the country and its territorial waters. Penalties include imprison-
ment for up to 5 years and a fine for up to SAR 500,000; for other violations in envi-
ronmental laws, the specified fines are up to SAR 10,000 (Hall and Maabreh 2009) On the
other hand, the enforcement of environmental laws and regulations in the State of Kuwait
is relatively weak due to the failure of the executing authorities and also due to the
reluctance of the judiciary system to play a leading role in the interpretation of the laws
pertaining to environment, sometimes due to the judges’ capabilities in the field of envi-
ronmental law (Al-Awadhi 2002).
Obviously, there are some indicators that the Arab world is embracing the environment
and making attempts to catch up with the rest of the world. On June 18, 2009, at the Dead
Sea in Jordan, the Arab Network for Environmental Compliance and Enforcement
(ANECE) was established to promote cooperation between environmental enforcement
officials throughout the Arab world.
2.2 International environmental agreements
The second set of indicators of environmental involvement is the regional and international
commitments made by the individual countries. These indicators consist of the total
number of international environmental agreements (IEAs) signed, ratified, partied, and
entered into by force by the Arab States. Table 2 presents the data for each country in
addition to the mean scores for 123 developing countries in the world excluding the Arab
world for comparison purposes. These indicators are compiled from the International
Environmental Agreements Database Project. The term ‘‘international,’’ in this database, is
defined to mean intergovernmental as opposed to any other definition of the term. The term
‘‘agreement’’ is defined to mean a treaty, convention, or protocol among states with a
clause indicating consent to be bound by the agreement in written form and governed by
international law. The term ‘‘environmental’’ indicates any agreement that has a primary
purpose of managing or preventing human impacts on natural resources, plant and animal
species, water bodies, and other ecosystems (Ronald Mitchell and the IEA Database
Project 2002–2010).
The numbers in Table 2 indicate that there is a significant variation in the number of
IEAs signed by the Arab states. The North African countries of Morocco, Tunisia, and
Egypt, for instance, have signed the most number of agreements, 60, 54 and 54, respec-
tively; whereas the Gulf countries of Qatar and United Arab Emirates have signed rela-
tively fewer, 15 and 16, respectively. Obviously, the Maghreb countries are more proactive
than the Gulf countries as signatories to IEAs. However, what does it mean to be a
Environmental movement in the Arab world 747
123
signatory to an IEA? According to the United Nations, signing an agreement indicates the
intention of the country to take steps to be bound by the treaty at a later date. Signature
does not legally bind a country to implement the agreement immediately after signing;
however, it creates an obligation to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and
purpose of the treaty. The signatory must demonstrate their consent to be bound by the
treaty either by ratification or by accession. These methods are considered willingness to
undertake the legal rights and obligations contained in the agreement. Ratification legally
binds a state to implement the agreement, subject to valid reservations, understandings, and
declarations. Accession legally binds the state to implement the agreement. At the moment
the convention enters into force, it becomes legally binding on the countries.
A careful look at Table 2 indicates that the North African Arab countries including
Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, and Egypt have significantly larger number of IEA ratification
and accession from the rest of the Arab world, mainly due to the many regional agreements
that these countries take part in, such as the African Convention on the Conservation of
Nature and Natural Resources, the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone treaty, and the
Convention to Combat Desertification, among many others. However, it is also important
Table 2 Total number of inter-
national environmental
agreements
Source: compiled by the author
from IEA Database Projects
Country Signatures Ratification
and accession
Entry into
forces
Algeria 30 49 26
Bahrain 14 28 9
Djibouti 20 32 15
Egypt 54 67 38
Iraq 6 23 9
Jordan 29 38 24
Kuwait 22 33 15
Lebanon 37 42 21
Libya 26 44 29
Mauritania 26 39 19
Morocco 60 69 39
Oman 21 39 21
Palestine 2 1 1
Qatar 15 36 16
Saudi Arabia 18 39 21
Somalia 11 18 8
Sudan 21 35 14
Syria 32 57 29
Tunisia 54 66 38
United Arab Emirates 16 33 18
West Sahara 0 0 0
Yemen 15 28 10
Mean Arab world (SD) 24.04 (15.96) 37.09 (18.05) 19.09 (11.04)
Mean developing
world (SD)
27.88 (15.58) 39.62 (16.64) 18.57 (10.24)
T stat for equality of
means
-1.03 -0.58 0.339
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to note the Gulf countries, over the last decade, have committed to many international
agreements that were introduced back in the early seventies and eighties, thus indicating
more proactive attitude toward the international community. For instance, The UAE
accessed the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Control (the Montreal
Protocol and its five amendments) in 2005; Qatar, on the other hand, ratified the latest two
amendments of the Montreal Protocol in 2009. Note that many of the Arab countries,
including the Gulf countries, have been players in the international community for many
decades. The first international agreement that Lebanon signed was in 1949 in Rome; it
was the only Arab country participating and signing this international agreement that
required international cooperation in development and utilization of the resources of the
Mediterranean Sea. The UAE is a party to various international treaties regarding envi-
ronmental protection including the 1972 London Convention on the Prevention of Marine
Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft (as amended), the 1973 Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora; Annex 16 on Envi-
ronmental Protection of the 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation,
among many others.
The averages reported in Table 2 for both the Arab countries and the developing
countries indicate that the number of legally binding agreements is systematically and
significantly greater than the total number of signatures. However, the difference between
the averages for the Arab countries and the developing countries is not significantly dif-
ferent from zero. This supports the notion that the Arab world does not lag behind the
developing world when we use the IEAs as indicators of environmental engagement. The
interesting question is, of course, to determine the causes of the observed variations in the
values of the indicators.
2.3 Environmental performance index
Another comparative indicator of environmental stewardship, developed by Emerson et al.
(2010), is the environmental performance index (EPI) that measures the ability of countries
to actively manage and protect their environment and the health of their citizens. The
overall EPI is a weighted index constructed by allocating 50% weight for environmental
health objective (Health) and 50% for ecosystem vitality objective (Ecosystem). The
overall EPI ranges from zero to 100, with zero indicating worst performance and 100
indicating performance at target. The 2010 values of overall EPI, Health and Ecosystem
and their respective ranks for the Arab countries are presented in Table 3. Algeria records
the highest EPI score of 67.4 in the Arab world and ranks number 42 among the 163
countries for which scores are constructed; whereas Mauritania scores the lowest value of
33.7 and ranks 161. Note that EPI scores are not constructed for Palestine, Somalia, and
Western Sahara.
We observe significant variation in environmental performance across the Arab coun-
tries with a mean EPI score of 52.57 and a standard deviation of 9.59. The highest EPI
score of 93.5 worldwide is assigned to Iceland and the lowest score of 32.1 is allocated for
Sierra Leon. With few exceptions, the developed countries with strong commitment to
environmental management make up a large portion of top performers. It is important to
note that there is not a single Arab country in the top quartile of the EPI distribution, but
there are 7 countries in the lowest quartile including Yemen, Sudan, Oman, Bahrain, Iraq,
United Arab Emirates, and Mauritania. Note that many of these countries are well endowed
with resources and are considered part of the developed world. When we compare the
mean Arab EPI scores with the mean score of developing countries, the difference is not
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statistically significant (t = 0.97) indicating that the Arabs perform as well as all devel-
oping countries; however, the difference with the mean world score is significantly positive
(t = 2.41) in favor of the world mean (world mean = 58.37 and standard
deviation = 12.41).
When we consider the two target components of the EPI, we observe a different pattern.
Algeria ranks twelfth in terms of Health target component and ranks third in terms of
ecosystem vitality component. There seems to be a positive correlation, as expected,
between income and health objective performance. Wealthy countries perform better in
management of health at the expense of ecosystem objective. See, for instance, Bahrain
with a health score of 83.69, ranking second in the Arab world and twenty-fifth globally,
has an ecosystem target index of 0.23, ranking the second to worst performer (United Arab
Emirates) globally and within the Arab world. When we compare the Arab world mean
health and ecosystem scores with the means of the developing world, we observe signif-
icantly higher health score and significantly lower ecosystem score for the Arab world;
whereas, if we compare with the world means, the difference is insignificant with respect to
health score and significantly positive with respect to ecosystem vitality.
Table 3 Environmental Performance Indices
Country EPI Rank Health Rank Ecosystem Rank
Algeria 67.4 1 67.58 12 67.25 3
Bahrain 42.0 16 83.69 2 0.23 18
Djibouti 60.5 6 51.45 15 69.64 2
Egypt 62.0 4 63.04 14 60.97 5
Iraq 41.0 17 39.57 16 42.42 10
Jordan 56.1 8 76.67 7 35.56 13
Kuwait 51.1 10 83.47 3 18.78 16
Lebanon 57.9 7 77.33 5 38.5 12
Libya 50.1 11 68.09 11 32.19 14
Mauritania 33.7 19 25.97 18 41.36 11
Morocco 65.6 2 73.38 9 57.84 6
Oman 45.9 15 71.28 10 20.47 15
Palestine – – – – – –
Qatar 48.9 12 87.69 1 10.08 17
Saudi Arabia 55.3 9 66.68 13 43.96 9
Somalia – – – – – –
Sudan 47.1 14 23.61 19 70.58 1
Syria 64.6 3 73.67 8 55.49 7
Tunisia 60.6 5 77.16 6 44.00 8
United Arab Emirates 40.7 18 81.29 4 0.06 19
West Sahara – – – – – –
Yemen 48.3 13 34.95 17 61.68 4
Mean Arab world (SD) 52.57 (9.59) – 64.55 (19.83) – 40.58 (22.41) –
Mean developing world (SD) 54.93 (11.12) – 52.67 (23.31) – 57.19 (17.43) –
T stat for equality of means 0.97 – -2.35 – 3.08 –
Source: compiled by the author from 2010 Environmental Performance Index
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3 Determinants of environmental commitment and performance
There seems to be a significant variation in environmental stewardship across the Arab
world as measured by the indicators we presented above. We next pose the following
question: What would account for this observed variation?
Environmental commitment and performance are expected to be a function of variety of
factors including income and existing environmental conditions. If prevailing environ-
mental conditions are acceptable, then there is no need to expend any resources or efforts
for correction purposes. On the other hand, the willingness and ability to expend efforts for
enhances environmental quality will increase with income. Following the logic used in the
empirical literature on the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) that describes how envi-
ronmental quality evolves as the economy makes a transition from poverty to wealth, we
empirically test the relationship between environmental commitment and performance and
economic well-being.
The EKC hypothesis states that pollution will first increase with income as growth
occurs in a poor country because the country places a low priority on pollution control;
however, once the country becomes well-off, it will start considering the protection of
environmental quality as a priority issue; as a result, pollution will start to decrease at
higher levels of income. Note that this reasoning suggests that ‘‘economic growth is
essential for environmental stewardship’’ (World Bank 1992) and ‘‘in the end the best—
and probably the only—way to attain a decent environment in most countries is to become
rich’’ Beckerman (1992). Nevertheless, the empirical literature on EKC is mixed. While
there is some evidence that some pollutants follow an inverse U-shaped pattern relative to
income (see Shafik and Bandyopadhyay (1992), Grossman and Krueger (1995), Selden and
Song (1994), Holtz-Eakin and Selden (1995)), the relationship is not universal (see, Stern
and Common 2001; Harbaugh et al. 2000).
3.1 The empirical model
The EKC models usually posit the indicator of environmental quality under consider-
ation as a function of income, income square, and even a cubic function of income. The
model then is used to determine turning points. In the case of cubic function, the model
yields an N-shaped curve. Researchers have examined a variety of pollutants for evi-
dence of EKC pattern, including sulfur dioxide, suspended particulates, lead, mercury
(Grossman and Krueger 1995), rate of deforestation (Panayotou 1993), lack of safe
water and sanitation (Shafik and Bandyopadhyay 1992), and biodiversity loss (Asafu-
Adjaye 2003).
In this paper, we hypothesize that environmental involvement and performance will
increase with income. To test this hypothesis, we posit and estimate the following reduced
form behavioral model:
Indicatorij ¼ aþ b0Incomei þ b1Income2i þ
X
k
ckZki þ ei;
where Indicatorji is the jth indicator of environmental commitment and performance (j = 1
,…, 7) for a given country i; income is the indicator of economic well-being in location i;
Zki is a vector of socioeconomic characteristics (k = 1 ,…, 6) that may help explain
variations in environmental performance; and ei is the error term.
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3.2 Variable description and data sources
The analysis is conducted using cross-sectional data from various sources. Note that for all
of the indicators compiled, there are no time series data or any consistent panel data that
can be used. The EPI has been published previously under the name Environmental
Sustainability Index, and the authors specify that the indices cannot be compared. In fact,
since the number of observations is very limited when considering only the countries in the
League of Arab States, excluding Palestine and Western Sahara, we use a host of devel-
oping countries worldwide for which data are available. The list of the countries included
in the analysis is presented in Table 4.
The dependent variable in the alternative models is defined as the indicator of envi-
ronmental performance, most of which were introduced in section 2 above. The total
number of IEA signatures (Indicator 1), accessions, and ratifications (Indicator 2), and
entry into force (Indicator 3) is obtained from the International Environmental Agreements
Database Project. The total number of terrestrial protected areas (Indicator 4) is obtained
from the World Bank Database 2008. While not discussed earlier, protected areas can be
used also as indicators of environmental commitment due to the nature of effort that
countries have to expend in order to have a place listed as a protected site. The EPI
Table 4 List of countries used in study
Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
Angola
Argentina
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Belarus
Belize
Benin
Bolivia
Botswana
Brazil
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon
Central African Republic
Chad
Chile
China
Colombia
Comoros
Congo, Rep.
Costa Rica
Coˆte d’Ivoire
Croatia
Djibouti
Dominica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt, Arab Rep.
El Salvador
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Fiji
Gabon
Gambia, The
Georgia
Ghana
Grenada
Guatemala
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Honduras
India
Indonesia
Iran, Islamic Rep.
Iraq
Jamaica
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Korea, Dem. Rep.
Kuwait
Kyrgyz Republic
Lao PDR
Latvia
Lebanon
Liberia
Libya
Lithuania
Macedonia, FYR
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico
Moldova
Mongolia
Morocco
Mozambique
Namibia
Nepal
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Oman
Pakistan
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Poland
Qatar
Romania
Russian federation
Rwanda
Samoa
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Solomon Islands
Somalia
South Africa
Sri Lanka
St. Kitts and Nevis
St. Lucia
St.Vincent and the Grenadines
Sudan
Suriname
Swaziland
Syrian Arab Republic
Tajikistan
Thailand
Togo
Tonga
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
United Arab Emirates
Ukraine
Uruguay
Uzbekistan
Vanuatu
Venezuela, RB
Vietnam
Yemen, Rep.
Zambia
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(Indicator 5), Health component of EPI (Indicator 6), and Ecosystem component of EPI
(Indicator 7) are obtained from the Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy.
The income variable is the GNI per capita obtained from World Development Indicators
published by the World Bank; the variable is adjusted for purchasing power parity and is
used as the indicator of economic well-being. The EKC hypothesis predicts that b0 [ 0 and
b1 \ 0 indicating that environmental awareness would be increasing with income at a
decreasing rate. A critical threshold is reached when oAwareness
oIncome ¼ 0at threshold
Income =  b0
2b1
[ 0, implying that b0 and b1 must be of opposite signs.
The vector Z is composed of socioeconomic and environmental variables that are
expected to explain variations in the dependent variable; most variables are obtained from
the World Development Indicators. Foreign direct investments (FDI) is used as a control
variable for global openness and liberalization; this variable is expected to have a positive
coefficient, cFDI [ 0. Countries that attract more FDI are expected to be relatively better
international players than others. While it is possible to argue that many of the developing
countries may be considered pollution havens and FDI flows into them for the purposes of
avoiding stringent environmental regulation, the available data would not allow the testing
of the pollution haven hypothesis.
The Arab world is captured in the model by a fixed affect dummy variable (ARAB) that
takes the value of 1 for all Arab League countries and 0 otherwise. This variable is
included to test whether the Arab countries differ from other countries in the developing
world. Based on the analysis in Section 2, we do not expect this variable to have a
significant coefficient in any of the specifications.
Two environmental variables are included in the model to control for prevailing
environmental conditions in the country, with the expectation that in the presence of
environmental degradation, there will be increased willingness to improve the situation
through remediation efforts such as committing to improvements through signing or
accessing IEAs or seeking better values foo the EPI. The percentage forest land (FOREST),
percentage of land area, and the emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2), in metric tons per
capita are used as two such indicators of environmental quality. Forest area is land under
natural or planted stands of trees of at least 5 meters in situ, whether productive or not, and
excludes tree stands in agricultural production systems (for example, in fruit plantations
and agroforestry systems) and trees in urban parks and gardens. Environmental preser-
vation is expected to be higher when a country has scarce resource base indicated by low
percentages in forest area. With reduction in forest areas, the protectionist movement is
expected to rise. As such, this variable is expected to have a negative coefficient, cFOR-
EST \ 0. The CO2 emissions are those stemming from the burning of fossil fuels and the
manufacture of cement. They include carbon dioxide produced during consumption of
solid, liquid, and gas fuels and gas flaring. Increased values of CO2 indicate deterioration in
environmental quality and as such create a movement toward remediation effort. The
expected sign of the coefficient of CO2 is positive, cCO2 [ 0.
The annual population growth (POPULATION) variable is included as a control vari-
able. Increased population growth is expected to exert pressure on the environment. For
some indicators, such as the EPI, ENVHEALTH, and ECOSYSTEM, the expected
response is negative to this variable; while for other indicators, we do not have an a priori
expectation about the sign of the coefficient.
The last variable on the list of explanatory variables is the total number of all registered
non-profit organizations (NGO) in a country, including environmental NGOs. The variable
is obtained from the World Association of Non-Governmental Organization (WANGO)
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Web site. Theoretically, NGOs are expected to exert pressure on governments to take
action and correct a wrong. While not all NGOs are successful, there are many local and
global NGOs (Greenpeace, Red Cross, for example) that have impacted the course of
events. While it would have been better to include only environmental NGOs, data are not
readily available for the variable. The expected sign for the coefficient of NGO is positive
for all indicators, cNGO [ 0. Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for all the variables used
in the analysis.
3.3 Estimation results and discussion
We estimate the specified model using ordinary least squares regression with linear
functional specification and correction for heteroskedasticity. Table 6 presents the esti-
mation results for the various indicators of environmental performance. The explanatory
power of the various models is better than expected. The coefficient of determination, R2,
ranges between 0.13 and 0.63 indicating that the variables combined explain from 13 to 63
percent of the observed variations in the dependent variables. The model with ENV-
HEALTH performs the best when using R2 as criterion of comparison. The results con-
sistently indicate that environmental performance is positively and significantly related to
income, except for the ECOSYSTEM model where the coefficient is negative but insig-
nificant. The estimated coefficients of income in the various models are significant at the
1% level of significance. This positive relation between income and performance subsides
as income level increases. The coefficient of the squared income term is systematically
negative and significant in most models basically yielding an inverted u-shaped curve, thus
supporting the EKC hypothesis. The estimated turning point for the curve ranges between
$29,100 and $36,900.
As anticipated, FDI is positively related to the performance indicators. In five out of
seven models, the coefficient of FDI is positive and significant at the 5% level or better.
This result lends support to the notion that openness and liberalization promote better
environmental stewardship.
The interesting result in this estimation process concerns the coefficients of the envi-
ronmental quality indicators FOREST and CO2. The coefficient of FOREST is negative in
the first three models where the performance indicators are numbers of IEAs signed,
ratified, or entered into force. In these models, the sign of the coefficient is negative and
can be justified on the ground that when green areas increase, the demand for and action
taken to remediate decreases. However, in none of these models the coefficient is signif-
icant. On the other hand, in the remaining four models that measure environmental per-
formance by number of terrestrial protected areas, the EPI, and its subcategories, the sign
of the coefficient estimate is positive as expected; however, it is only significant for EPI
model at the 10% level indicating that when the forest area increases, the environmental
performance index is improved. The coefficient of CO2 is negative and significant only in
the ECOSYSTEM model, indicating as expected that the ecosystem vitality is adversely
affected by increased levels of carbon emissions.
The coefficient of population growth is consistently negative in all formulations;
however, it is significantly negative only in the EPI and the ENVHEALTH models.
The coefficient of NGOs is positive and significant in the first three specifications
indicating that the larger the number of non-governmental organizations the higher the
level of international environmental involvement. It is surprising not to observe a signif-
icant coefficient for NGO in the protected areas model since the process of designating an
area as a protected site requires that a group initiates the request. Note that the variable
754 S. Djoundourian
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NGO is not exclusively environmental; if it were, then we would expect the coefficient to
be significant in this model. The NGO coefficient is curious negative and significant in the
ENVHEALTH model.
4 Conclusion
This paper conducted a comparative study across the Arab world in the Middle East
and North Africa to determine whether variations exist in environmental involvement and
performance. The review of the individual countries’ commitments to the local and
international community reveals that the Arab world has become relatively more active
and aware of the environment. With the exception of Oman and West Sahara, all members
of the Arab League have established ministries in charge of environmental issues. In few
instances, the ministries deal exclusively with the environment, in others, they have joint
responsibilities with either the water authorities or meteorology or urban development.
While many of the ministries have well-developed Web sites that provide ample infor-
mation about the laws governing the environment, others rely on international agencies
covering their news. Most of the countries have well-documented environmental laws and
regulations; Djibouti and Somalia are the exception.
When studying commitment to the environment at the international level, the analysis
revealed that the North African Arab countries have significantly larger number of IEA
ratification and accession from the rest of the Arab world, mainly due to the many regional
agreements that these countries take part in. In addition, the results indicated that the Arab
world does not lag behind the developing world when we use the IEAs as indicators of
environmental engagement. Furthermore, when we use the EPI as the indicator of per-
formance, the analysis revealed that while the mean EPI score for the Arab countries is
significantly lower than the mean world score, it is not statistically significantly different
from that of the developing world score.
The paper attempted to explain the observed variations in the indicators by estimating a
simple model of behavioral relationship between environmental performance and various
socio-economic variables. The study concluded that a relationship similar to the one
proposed by the EKC hypothesis was observed between environmental performance
indicators and economic well-being. The role of the NGOs in promoting international
engagement was supported in the IEA models.
In conclusion, the review indicated that the level of environmental involvement of the
Arab governments is at par with the developing world.
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